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AbsTrACT
Conflict is an important consideration in the intensive 
care unit (ICU). In this setting, conflict most commonly 
occurs over the ’best interests’ of the incapacitated adult 
patient; for instance, when families seek aggressive life- 
sustaining treatments, which are thought by the medical 
team to be potentially inappropriate. Indeed, indecision 
on futility of treatment and the initiation of end- of- life 
discussions are recognised to be among the greatest 
challenges of working in the ICU, leading to emotional 
and psychological ’burnout’ in ICU teams. When these 
disagreements occur, they may be within the clinical 
team or among those close to the patient, or between 
the clinical team and those close to the patient. It is, 
therefore, crucial to have a theoretical understanding of 
decision- making itself, as unpicking misalignments in the 
family’s and clinical team’s decision- making processes 
may offer strategies to resolve conflict. Here, we relate 
Kahneman and Tversky’s work on cognitive biases and 
behavioural economics to the ICU environment, arguing 
that these biases could partly explain disparities in 
the decision- making processes for the two conflicting 
parties. We suggest that through the establishment of 
common ground, challenging of cognitive biases and 
formulation of mutually agreeable solutions, mediation 
may offer a pragmatic and cost- effective solution to 
conflict resolution. The litigation process is intrinsically 
adversarial and strains the doctor–patient–relative 
relationship. Thus an alternative external party should be 
considered, however mediation is not frequently used 
and more research is needed into its effectiveness in 
resolving conflicts in the ICU.
InTrOduCTIOn
Conflict is an important consideration in the inten-
sive care init (ICU).1 With lengthening average 
life expectancies and widening availability of life- 
sustaining interventions; the question of when 
treatment becomes medically ‘futile’ (i.e. incapable 
of generating the desired physiological result) or 
inappropriate, is becoming increasingly difficult to 
answer.2 Advanced care planning in healthy indi-
viduals is infrequent,3 thus little consideration is 
given to whether a person would deem different 
treatment options to have a meaningful impact on 
their quality or length of life, while the person is 
able to communicate these views.4 These conver-
sations consequently arise when the person is no 
longer able to participate in the decision- making 
process, due to the severity of their illness. In 
England and Wales, doctors frequently determine 
the course of medical treatment, based on what 
they reasonably believe to be best for the incapac-
itated patient. Families, who are consulted in this 
process, may feel accountable for making difficult 
choices from the imagined perspective of a patient; 
to either seek aggressive, life- sustaining treatments 
or focus on symptom management at the end- of- 
life.2 Interestingly, empirical evidence suggests 
that independent elderly individuals are reluctant 
to accept life- sustaining treatments such as inva-
sive mechanical ventilation and renal replacement 
therapy, as they can negatively affect quality of 
life.4 5 These findings have recently been validated 
across Europe.6 However, conflict most commonly 
occurs when families seek aggressive life- sustaining 
treatments that are thought, by the medical team, 
to be potentially inappropriate.4 The international 
‘Conflicus’ study surveyed the experiences of 7498 
ICU staff members in 323 ICUs. Nurse–physician 
conflicts were most common (32.6%) and staff–
relative conflicts accounted for 26.2% of perceived 
conflicts.1 Indecision on futility of treatment and the 
initiation of end- of- life discussions are recognised 
to be among the greatest challenges of working in 
the ICU, leading to emotional and psychological 
‘burnout’ in ICU teams.7 Given its harmful effects, 
a deeper understanding of why conflict occurs is 
necessary, alongside potential strategies to resolve 
it.
When dOes COnflICT OCCur?
Conflict is taken to mean a ‘a serious disagreement 
or argument, typically a protracted one’. The term 
conflict is often used interchangeably with ‘dispute’, 
however, Burton and Dukes offer a distinction 
between the two, based on timescale and the nego-
tiability of the issues at hand. Conflicts may involve 
long- term, non- negotiable issues whereas disputes 
are short- term and usually quickly resolved.8 In 
the ICU, conflicts frequently relate to entrenched 
disagreements over decisions being made in a 
patient’s ‘best interests’.
As per the Mental Capacity (MCA) 2005 in 
England and Wales, most adult patients in the 
ICU are incapacitated due to either the effects of 
sedation, which is necessary for organ support, or 
the encephalopathy associated with critical illness. 
This results in ‘an impairment of or disturbance in 
the functioning of [their] mind or brain’,9 which 
prevents a person from understanding, retaining, 
deliberating or communicating healthcare decisions; 
therefore inferring they lack capacity to make these 
decisions. Principle 4 of the MCA states that where 
a person has been assessed as lacking capacity, any 
decision made for or on behalf of that person should 
be made in their best interests. Indeed, the best 
interests standard applies to incompetent or inca-
pacitated persons of all ages in many international 
jurisdictions.10 There is no definition in the MCA, 
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or Code of Practice, about who this ‘decision- maker’ is.9 11 In the 
context of ICU, when the patient does not have an advance deci-
sion to refuse treatment (ADRT) or a lasting power of attorney 
(LPA) for Health and Welfare decisions, the decision- maker, in 
practice, is the consultant intensivist with clinical responsibility 
for the incapacitated patient.12 (Similar instruments and roles 
exist internationally, such as Advance Directives and Durable 
Powers of Attorney in the USA).13 Any decisions made in the 
patient’s best interests, should achieve the purpose that is being 
sought, in the way that is least restrictive of their rights and free-
doms.9 A person can write an ADRT, which — assuming it is 
valid and applicable — is determinative with regard to refusal 
of the specified future treatments.9 If this document exists and 
there is no doubt of its legality or intention, it must be respected. 
If an ADRT is not available or applicable, the decision- maker 
must take into account anyone previously named by the patient 
as someone to be consulted, and anyone engaged in caring for 
the person or interested in their welfare.
Conflicts may occur when there is a prolonged disagreement 
about where the best interests of the patient lie. For instance, 
when families favour preservation of life and physicians are 
reluctant to provide aggressive treatment, which they deem to 
be inappropriate. Nevertheless, it is worth acknowledging that a 
treatment may still further the patient’s reasonable goals of care, 
even if it is not curative or palliative, and it is not merely inap-
propriate because it has a low probability of success.14 Ultimately, 
conflict could arise in any healthcare setting, in any jurisdiction. 
Thus, the discussion around best interests conflicts in ICUs could 
be extrapolated to other conflicts between healthcare teams and 
representatives of the incapacitated (or incompetent) patient.
Why dOes COnflICT OCCur?
When there is contention about the patient’s best interests, 
conflict can develop. The disagreement may be within the clinical 
team or among those close to the patient, or between the clinical 
team and those close to the patient. It is therefore crucial to have 
a theoretical understanding of decision- making itself. Unpicking 
misalignments in the family’s and physician’s decision- making 
processes may offer strategies to resolve conflict. Although 
the adult ICU is given as the primary example, these ideas are 
broadly applicable to other specialties, such as paediatric inten-
sive care, palliative care, and care of the elderly.
Acclaimed theories in cognitive psychology and behavioural 
economics suggest how people make decisions. Kahneman and 
Tversky’s ‘prospect theory’ states that individuals make deci-
sions based on the potential value of losses and gains, rather 
than the final outcome. A decision- maker will determine what 
outcomes are equivalent and set these as a ‘reference point’. 
The economic interpretation of this theory sets current assets or 
the status quo as a reference point, however, this can be readily 
applied to choices involving other attributes. In healthcare one 
can set their current quality of life as a reference point. Lesser 
outcomes in relation to this reference point are classified as 
‘losses’, whereas greater outcomes are classified as ‘gains’. Pros-
pect theory also offers the concept of ‘loss aversion’. Simply 
phrased, this is the idea that losses hurt more than gains feel 
good. Loss aversion is relative to expectations however, as an 
expectation of a great loss may lead to the interpretation of 
only a small loss as a gain.15 Implementing this in the health-
care setting, Kahneman and Tversky suggest that a person 
will make a decision to avoid losses, thus the decision- making 
process of a patient’s family members will be influenced by their 
desire to avoid the loss of their relative. Furthermore, if they are 
expecting their relative to die, they may interpret loss of quality 
of life as a comparative gain. Loss aversion, as an observed 
phenomenon, favours stability over changes in the status quo.16 
This may explain why relatives continue seeking life- prolonging 
treatments for their relative, at the expense of quality of life. 
This could also be explained by another observation noted by 
Kahneman and Tversky. They suggested that a person who had 
not made peace with their financial losses, would be more likely 
to accept gambles that would otherwise be unacceptable to him 
or her. Similarly, relatives who have not yet accepted the patient 
is dying, may be keen to attempt treatment options with small 
chances of success, including those considered by the medical 
team to be potentially inappropriate. Another well- established 
theory states that an individual’s tendency to bet on ‘long shots’ 
increases throughout the betting day. If the betting day is taken 
to be the length of an ICU admission, families may wish to seek 
treatments with considerable risk or minimal chances of success, 
longer into the admission.15 Certainly, the idea of risk- seeking in 
losses was observed to be a robust effect in several psychological 
experiments. A large majority of people expressed a preference 
for the gamble over the secure loss. Hence, family decision- 
makers may insist on improbable treatment options, where the 
alternative would be guaranteed loss of their relative.16
Kahneman and Tversky also propose how a reference point is 
set, suggesting that the past and present context of experience 
defines an individual’s adaptation level. Thus, external events 
are perceived in relation to this reference point. For instance, a 
certain level of health may imply disability for one person and 
great health for another, depending on their previous experiences 
of illness. As critics of normative models of decision- making, 
particularly Bernoulli’s ‘expected utility theory’,17 Kahneman 
and Tversky offered a descriptive model whereby focus lay on 
people’s beliefs and preferences. They argue that humans do 
not naturally make logical or rational choices but instead, the 
decision- making process is framed by ‘cognitive biases’. This 
is secondary to a tendency to oversimplify decisions by basing 
their understanding of the decision on their previous experi-
ences, which are probably unrepresentative sets of observations. 
Hence, Kahneman suggests that the mind primarily deals with 
‘known knowns’, which are its observations. It rarely considers 
‘known unknowns’, which are recognised as relevant but do not 
factor significantly into the decision- making process, due to a 
lack of experiential information. The human mind is therefore 
oblivious to ‘unknown unknowns’, i.e. occurrences, of which the 
mind has no prior knowledge or experience.18
Anecdotally, families insist that their relative ‘is a fighter’ 
or ‘has been here before’, when they have previously survived 
other bouts of illness or psychosocial ordeals.19 This can fuel a 
desire to persist with aggressive therapy, as family members hold 
the distorted assumption that future outcomes will mirror the 
past. Likewise, this concept can be applied to physicians. With 
10%–29% of all ICU admissions ending in mortality,20 the deci-
sions of ICU clinicians are more likely to be influenced by the 
relative normalisation of death as an outcome for critically unwell 
patients. Their reference point with regard to the patient is also 
likely to be lesser than a relative’s, as their only encounter with 
the patient is during a period of severe illness. This highlights 
the importance of determining a person’s functional baseline, 
when determining treatment options. Death is at risk of being 
perceived as less of a loss by physicians than it would be for the 
relative, whose reference point is of a well person.21 Thus, the 
variance in decision- making could be explained by disparities 
in the prior experiences and knowledge of the two conflicting 
parties. A difference in emotional ties to the patient is also of 
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obvious importance, however the decision- maker’s psycholog-
ical frame of mind is not accounted for in prospect theory. This 
shortcoming has been recognised, as critics of Kahneman and 
Tversky’s work cite their lack of recognition of emotion as one 
of the failings of prospect theory as a descriptive model of deci-
sion theory.22
Several psychological experiments have defined other cogni-
tive biases, or pitfalls in the rationality of decision- making, 
which do account for emotions. An example is ‘confirmation 
bias’: the tendency to search for information in such a way 
that confirms pre- existing beliefs.23 This bias is noted to have 
a stronger effect in the context of emotionally charged issues. 
It becomes apparent in ICU, when families display a tendency 
to seek information that validates their belief that their relative 
has a good chance of survival. This can be compounded with 
another observed psychological phenomenon known as ‘the 
boomerang effect’, where attempts to persuade an individual of 
a certain view leads to the unintended adoption of the opposing 
position instead. Hovland et al noted this was more likely to 
occur in situations where the attempts at persuasion trigger 
unremitting emotional distress (as in the case of withdrawing 
life- sustaining treatment) or when the communicator’s position 
is far removed from the recipient’s (as in the case of a doctor–
relative relationship).24 This may explain why attempts by ICU 
clinicians to convince relatives to withdraw life- sustaining treat-
ment can paradoxically cement their view to continue with such 
treatment, leading to intractable disputes. Equally, rather than 
negatively responding to the physicians’ response, one may 
hold a (falsely) optimistic view of the potential outcome. ‘Opti-
mism overconfidence’ here describes the phenomenon where an 
individual believes that he or she is less likely to experience a 
negative event. Hence, his or her position will be based on an 
unrealistic analysis of the potential outcomes.25 A relative may 
assume that the patient is less likely to die, due to their percep-
tion of the situation. However, optimism bias occurs more often 
when people perceive themselves to have greater control over 
events than other people (e.g. ‘I am less likely to crash a car if I 
am the driver’), which is not the case in an ICU setting. Indeed, 
the opposite can hold true and one may be less optimistic if they 
have prior experience of similar events.26 Thus, ICU clinicians, 
who encounter withdrawal of treatment decisions regularly, may 
possess less optimistic views of the potential outcomes, guided 
by evidence- based prognostication.27 This leads to further diver-
gence between the views of families and ICU clinicians.
WhAT shOuld We dO When COnflICT ArIses?
When a disagreement occurs over the treatment of an inca-
pacitated patient, hereafter referred to as P, a decision must 
somehow be reached. When P’s wishes are clearly known, 
through an ADRT or LPA (or their international equivalents), 
one must defer to those wishes. If a best interests decision must 
be made, one cannot routinely accept the clinical team’s deci-
sion in isolation, as the best interests principle within the MCA 
2005 clearly states that the views of those close to P must be 
considered. Conversely, if one adopts the family’s point of view 
as default, this negates the clinical team’s expertise and previous 
experience. While the right to self- determination provides a 
negative freedom to refuse treatment, as entitled by the principle 
of autonomy, this cannot be adapted into a positive freedom to 
demand life- sustaining interventions (despite the wishes of the 
patient or family) as was demonstrated in R (Burke).28 This 
leaves a final option: to involve a third- party.
In England and Wales, recent case law has encouraged parties 
to seek alternative dispute resolution methods, the learnings 
from which can be applied to various healthcare settings. In Re: 
Y, Lady Black reinforced a reasonable course of action for deter-
mining the best interests of a patient with a prolonged disorder 
of consciousness. In her judgement, she emphasised the involve-
ment of a senior independent clinician in the decision- making 
process, to ensure that ‘the interests of patients and their families 
are safeguarded, as far as possible, against errors in diagnosis 
and evaluation, premature decisions, and local variations in 
practice’.29 For P’s relatives, however, another doctor might not 
be seen as a neutral or independent party. If the second medical 
opinion aligns with the first physician’s, it may even reinforce 
the conflicting views of the involved parties, as per the previ-
ously described boomerang effect. Thus, it may help to safeguard 
the interests of the patient but it will not necessarily benefit the 
doctor- patient- relative relationship. Lady Black’s judgement 
confirmed that ‘if the provisions of the MCA 2005 are followed 
and the relevant guidance observed, and if there is agreement 
on what is in the best interests of the patient, the patient may 
be treated in accordance with that agreement without applica-
tion to the court’.29 If a consensus cannot be reached on the 
best interests of P, an application to the court can and should be 
made. Given that litigation is universally a costly process, both 
emotionally and financially, it can reasonably be described as a 
last resort.
Increasing attention has since been given to other ways of 
resolving conflict, before it reaches the courtroom. In the recent 
Gard case, where a conflict occurred between the physicians 
and family caring for a young child, Justice Francis suggested 
that ‘mediation should be attempted in all cases such as this 
one even if all that it does is achieve a greater understanding 
by the parties of each other’s positions’.30 Mediation is a non- 
adjudicative process that has long been used as a form of alterna-
tive dispute resolution throughout the world,31 32 notably where 
legal proceedings relate to disputes of money or the welfare of 
children. As children have always been recognised as the ‘inca-
pacitated’ fraction of society, having (below the age of sixteen) 
to prove their competence (unlike adults, where capacity is 
assumed), they too have always had their best interests deter-
mined by proxy decision- makers. However, with an increasing 
prevalence of age- related incapacitating disease, it is important 
to extend these principles to the elderly population. A compre-
hensive Canadian report on ‘elder law’ aimed to appraise media-
tion as a method for resolving disputes in the care of the elderly 
population, where the elderly person is still conscious and 
presumably able to participate in the decision- making process 
(although with questionable capacity). It emphasised the vital 
role of mediation in dispute resolution between families and 
healthcare providers, around the best interests of P.33
Mediation itself is difficult to define, as it has several 
approaches. However, it is described by Mary Radford as:
A process in which an impartial third party — a mediator — 
facilitates the resolution of a dispute by promoting voluntary 
agreement (or ‘self- determination’) by the parties to the dispute. 
A mediator facilitates communications, promotes understanding, 
focuses the parties on their interests, and seeks creative problem- 
solving to enable the parties to reach their own agreement.31
No formal model of mediation exists, as mediators come 
from a variety of professional backgrounds with varying experi-
ence. However, the Canadian report concluded that a successful 
mediator in these cases requires a sound understanding of both 
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Confidential Part of public record
Formulation of mutually agreed solution 
between conflicting parties
Decisions made by external party 
(judge)
Time- scale determined by conflicting parties Time- consuming
Less regulated Subject to formal review
A mutually agreed solution may not be made Necessarily leads to resolution
medicine and the law.33 The overarching premise of mediation 
is to reunite the two conflicting parties, with each party advo-
cating their own interests, before reaching a mutually agreeable 
decision about P. This contrasts to litigation, where one of the 
two conflicting parties is ultimately set to ‘lose’, thus securing 
the wedge between them (see table 1).34 A key approach in 
mediation is to challenge the cognitive biases, or ‘de- bias’, 
the two conflicting parties.35 By dispelling confounders in the 
decision- making process for both parties, it is possible to estab-
lish common ground and resurface the central issue, which is the 
determination of P’s the best interests.
Critics of mediation raise concerns around its regulation. 
While litigation is well established and subject to formal review, 
mediation relies on the fairness and ability of the trained medi-
ator, often in a private setting. This objectivity is a fundamental 
ethical consideration in mediation and relies on the mediator’s 
own ethical code of practice.31 Maintaining a neutral position 
also allows the mediator’s primary aim to be achieved: to facil-
itate, not impose, a decision that is acceptable to both parties. 
A partial answer to this concern is that in cases issued in the 
Court of Protection, any agreement reached through media-
tion about P’s best interests would need to be reviewed by the 
Court. This clearly would not apply in non- issued cases. Austin 
and Huxtable have also suggested the use of mediation and clin-
ical ethics committees in conjunction as a possible avenue for 
conflict resolution, to address concerns around possible over-
sight of ethical issues in the mediation process.36 A further criti-
cism of mediation is that each party may conflate their interests 
with the best interests of P.31 Accordingly, it is important that the 
mediator has independent access to P, to ensure that P’s voice is 
heard during the mediation process; although this is invariably 
more challenging if P is, for example, sedated.
Recognition of mediation as a possible means of dispute 
resolution resulted in the formation of the Medical Mediation 
Foundation in 2010.37 National Health Service Resolution has 
also begun to offer mediation in clinical negligence incidents 
and claims.38 Yet further research is needed into the effective-
ness of mediation in the medical setting. Brierley et al’s review 
of dispute resolution at Great Ormand Street Hospital (GOSH) 
reported no instances in which mediation was used, although 
this is likely due to the fact that mediation was not readily avail-
able for healthcare disputes at the time.39 Mediation is arguably 
regarded a last resort,40 by which point the dispute has become 
intractable and both parties have become entrenched in their 
views. It is worth noting that in this study, discussions around 
treatment withdrawal between clinicians and parents of critically 
ill children were successful in nearly 95% of cases39; although 
this may not be representative of dispute resolution overall, as 
clinicians at GOSH are presumably more accustomed to having 
difficult conversations about patients with complex medical 
needs.36 In Birchley et al’s study of best interests decision- 
making in paediatric ICU (PICU), PICU clinicians expressed a 
reluctance to involve the courts, due to the unpredictability of 
legal outcomes.41 This avoidance of external input may result in 
support being sought too late, therefore worsening the conflict.40 
Given this inherent reluctance to approach the courts, mediators 
may have a crucial role as an alternative third- party, earlier in the 
dispute resolution process.
COnClusIOn
Conflict is unfortunately inevitable, hence it is important to set 
up modelling and tools to minimise conflicts. A deeper under-
standing of why conflict occurs may allow ICU clinicians to 
recognise and challenge their own cognitive biases, as well as 
those of patients’ relatives, thus preventing escalation of conflict 
when it does occur. When this is not possible, there are options 
to resolve conflict with external input. While the court is always 
available as the final arbiter and therefore has its own key place 
in the conflict resolution sphere, it is not an attractive or practical 
option for doctors or families. The litigation process is intrinsi-
cally adversarial and strains the doctor–patient–relative relation-
ship. Thus, an alternative external party should be considered. 
Through the establishment of common ground, challenging of 
cognitive biases and formulation of mutually agreeable solu-
tions; mediation may offer a pragmatic and cost- effective solu-
tion to conflict resolution. Mediation is not, however, frequently 
used and more research is needed into its effectiveness in the 
intensive care environment.
Twitter Harleen Kaur Johal @harleen_johal and Christopher Danbury @medic_
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